Oh dear how tiresome, trying to make out a few blurry aerial views re-write the evidence that has been available for many years from German & Soviet archives. The author’s Conclusion falls flat in its first sentence viz “…the Soviets suffered a major defeat…”. There is little remaining dispute that the AFV loss ratio was approx. 9 to 1 in the German’s favour, although the reported losses on both sides (if taken solely from daily reports) don’t fully account for how many “losses” were subsequently recovered, repaired and put back into action - it's very complicated. The true figures on both sides will forever be disputed and it’s not hard to understand why. Whichever side you were on, it was the immense pressure to give the best possible spin on your own losses to your superiors in daily reports – to risk telling the truth risked at best demotion, at worse the firing squad.

The plain fact is that the GERMANS suffered a major defeat – their objective was to isolate and reduce a large section of the Soviet army via the Kursk pincer movement - THEY FAILED! The Soviet objective was to lure the Germans into exactly that tactic and destroy enough of their forces to render any further offensive capability impossible. THEY SUCCEEDED! The proof being that from the battle of Prokhorovka onwards the Germans were in retreat right through to the battle of the Reichstag, Berlin in April 1945. So please tell me in what way the Soviets suffered a major defeat? Major losses yes absolutely, but they – unlike the Germans – could “afford” them.

I find it particularly interesting that (in my opinion) the most balanced and scholarly work of recent times is not even mentioned in the author’s references – probably because his thesis wouldn’t stand up to it. I refer to Mark Healy’s “Zitadelle”, which reviewed most of the other sources quoted. If you're looking for the best available account (with many excellent photos) I recommend that book, and I have no connection with it or the author.