I'm in the midst of reading Thunder Run and I've had a number of questions. For starters, I'm simply amazed at the amount of ordanance expended on both sides. Second, do we have any idea of the types of RPG's the Iraqis were firing? There is a really interesting and detailed anaylsis of the armor protection trials for a Russian T-80 here:

T-80 armor protection trials

In it they come to the conclusion what one of the most deady anti-armor weapons is the RPG-29. Do we know if any of the RPGs fired on the Thunder Run were RPG-29s?

Additionally, what were the exact M1 Abrams types used? Are there any images about of the tanks post Thunder Run? That would be very interesting!

Very informative!not sure about thunder run though!!!

Mike - i agree about how much ordance was exploded. Its just amazing. BTW that is a great book for anyone who hasnt read it yet.(Pick it up)

Concord Publications books on OIF have a pic of Cojone's Eh after it was destroyed so the iraqis couldnt use it. The author spells the name wrong, although you can clearly see it on the bore evacuator. He also gives an interesting story from an iraqi general after the Thunder Run has departed.

HTH

Matt

No idea what model RPGs they were shooting at us. As for the Abrams, 3ID had all standard M1A1s.

There's a rumor that Concord will be coming out with two books that cover the 3rd ID in OIF. Gino may even have heard about it :-) ; but it's just a rumor for now. Anyway, I understand there will be photos showing the damage sustained by 1-64, who took part in the first thunder run, and damage sustained in the second thunder run by the 2nd Brigade. No idea when this will come out though, if it does.

For now I think you there are some web sites that show damage in many forms. Maybe some one else here can give an address or two.

I agree the book Thunder Run is very good. It really gives you an idea how intense the fighting was, on both sides. I was very surprised there was not even a photo section in the middle of the book; just that one photo on the back cover.

Anyway, there was a lot of different kinds of damage sustained to the tanks, as well as M113s and Bradleys. The pile gear was so extensive it was common that RPGs caught it on fire, and thus a few photos I have seen show a kind of melted look to the gear. I have read elsewhere that this caused problems for the Abrams when the burning/melting gear dripped into the grilles on the engine deck.

Another interesting factor of the M1 in Iraq was roadwheel shear. It was very common for tanks to lose at least one on a side, and most crews continued to run without replacing them due to parts issues, and the fact that they could get along without one on a side.

It is interesting to see from a modeling perspective all the green replacement parts on different tanks, from roadwheels, to fenders, to bin covers, to barrel shrouds.

Bob

"Thunder Run" is a great read! Highly recommended.

I'm puzzled by the incredible lack of photos from it as well, except maybe the combat was too intense. Still it seems like there'd be some after action shots.

I REALLY hope the rumors of a couple of Concorde books that were mentioned turn out true.

I have seen a couple of pics that were taken in the midst of the fight in the NBC OIF book/CD (or DVD) combo. Specifically there is one of (arghhhh forget the name) a Sgt I think...who was shot in the leg and was returning fire as he was being bandaged, as well as another shot of the "trenches" used by the Iraqis, under the overpasses- littered with RPG rounds, launchers and bodies...

If you go searching you can find some pics that may be Thunder Run. If I can dig out the right links I'll post them.

Jim

If Jaster can find those links, one way to tell if they were thunder run vehicles is by the large sideskirt number. In the first thunder run only the armored vehicles of 1-64 participated. Their sideskirt numbers were in the 50 series, ie 50, 51, 52, and 53. The entire 2nd Brigade participated in the second thunder run that went into the city centre. The 2nd Brigade numbers were in the 4, 5, and 6 series. There COULD have been some other numbers on divisional asset vehicles, but they should have a '/' on one side of the number (I can't remember at the moment which side).

Bob

I'll try and dig out the links in the next 2-3 days!

Jim

Look forward to seeing those links!

I have heard about the OIF books by Concorde. I have it from a pretty reliable source that these may be coming soon. They should contain some really good pics with some great Americans in them, some you may have heard of before????.

The vast majority are the same as you have seen on the news: RPG-7Vs. Probably a few RPG-2s, RPG-18s, and RPG-26s.

When you have an armored column such as that, the ordinance expended is amazing. Most of the stuff shot were MG rounds on the US side and RPG and small arms on the Iraqi side. Getting ammo in Iraq (for AKs, PKMs, RPGs, etc) is in no way hard and vastly outnumbered immediate US stockpiles (at the time of the invasion).

Jeff

Why is it that our experience in Iraq, with Thunder Run as just one example, has been so vastly different than the Russians in Chechnya in regards to armor in urban environments? I came across this article that analyses the Russian's experience:

Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience

The only major difference that I see that the article points out is that it appears the Chechnians were very organized and knew what they were doing in assaulting Russian armor.

Woodstock, first off, that article has been around a while and is still very good to read. I recommend it to those that haven't read it yet

Next, there are three main reasons (in my opinion) that Iraq was different than Chechnya (one of which may be a little too opiniated - I'm sorry)

1.) Terrain. Chechnya and Iraq are two completely different places. The mountainous terrain was not very sutable for armored vehicles to say nothing of the attacks the Russians used. This is especially true considering that (mentioned in the article) the Russians at least in the cities made reckless frontal assaults that cost them dearly. In the initial push for Baghdad, the 3ID leaned more towards the left, with the Marines a little to the right of a straight frontal assault. And in the first Thunder Run, Iraqi forces were oriented towards the airport when 2nd Brigade came from their rear. In the 2nd Thunder Run, while the Iraqi's knew which way the next attack would come, I don't think they expected it so soon or, like US commanders initally thought, didn't think that US units would stay in the city as they did.

2.) Training and equipment. US training, the most intensive in the world, focuses a lot on MOUT warfare. Though they avoided urban combat, that isn't to say they were not prepared or ready. I think commanders were more apprehensive - and rightly so - than anything else. The tactics that 2nd Brigade used in both Thunder Runs that covered the columns prevented RPG gunners from getting in too many rear shots. Plus, the Iraqis came at the US troops more recklessly than the Russians ever did themselves. Their attacks, though intense and close-in, came in patches, with little unit cohesion. Also, in the military world, Russian doctrine is well known. Commanders and units are not known for their flexabilty as much as their brute force and relentlessness if not recklessness. From what I have studied (those in uniform, correct me as needed). US doctrine, while public information, emphasises certain detailed preparation and planning, but a level of flexability during a battle, therefore more unpredictable. A higher up commander gets his orders and makes a certain set of parameters for this subordinate to follow them in. And this continues on down from the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Theater commanders all the way down to the fire team level.

Similarly, US equipment is very resiliant and arguably the world's best, especially the Abrams. Most were damaged and one was too damaged to go on, but they still soldiered on. One smacked into a bridge pillar destroying its main gun and it continued firing its coax. The Russians ran single file lines down city streets (US tanks were on a multi-lane highway for much of the runs) just waiting to have the first (usually a light scout vehicle or BMP) and last vehicles taken out, stranding the rest.

3.) Morale and determination. Much can be said about the determination of the Chechan fighters and its impact on their successes. The Russian's morale was destroyed as quickly as their vehicles and lives of their friends.

An army's morale is inversely proportional to its successes and combat losses. Compare it to this: Imagine you are a soccer player. You score a goal. You are elated. Your team is elated. The other team isn't. Your team scores more goals. And though the other team is still matching your goals, you are still able to wear down the other team until they can't play effectively any more allowing you to come back and win. Now imagine each goal is a tank and you see where I'm going with this. We didn't take nearly the amount of losses that the Russian took, both in life and equipment.

Also, In many ways Chechnya and Iraq are similar. Many of the techniques that the Russians died frinding out were put to good use in Iraq.

Hope this disertation helps. Sorry for its length.
Jeff

I'd have to say that being disorganized was THE major factor in the thunder runs working and Baghdad falling like it did without the expected siege. That and lack of training.

For instance, there were several recoiless rifles mounted on vehicles that were destroyed on or near the road. Also, a number of TOWs mounted on technicals were destroyed on or near the road. These are stand-off, defensive weapons that should have been in hull down positions, far from the roadside.

Even the regular army officers believed their own propaganda as highlighted by the Iraqi officer who ran into the side of a US AFV during the first thunder run. He said he had no idea that the US was nearby and was going to his unit that morning in his car. What successful army allows their officers to live at home while their troops suffer in the field?

The bottom line is that the Iraqi enemy (and their paramilitary friends from other countries) was poorly trained and organized.

Very informative all. Ultimately I guess I'm suprised at how resiliant the Abrams (and Bradleys!) were to multiple RPG impacts. Especially when you look at the loss rate that the Russians apparently had with their T-72s and T-80s. But if the Iraqis had utlised similar tactics on the Abrams (as the Chechens had on the T-72s and -80s), would the picture have been as rosey?

Maybe, maybe not. As noted above, many more factors play into this equation than just tactics. Aim and straightness of flight of a rocket. In the end, by our overall avoidance of prolonged urban battles where the objective was the city and not just getting through it, there were not many chances for the Iraqis to use such tactics.

Jeff

There are tons of action and after action shots, maybe the author didn't dig deep enough. I've seen tons and taken tons of photos myself. I just returned from the fighting in Falluja and have become stingy with the photos I post. I've seen many articles and after market manufacturers use my or other peoples photos with giving absolutely no credit.

Tanks Out
Andy

Maybe we could impose of you to set up a gallery here with the proper credit given. Something to talk to FAUST about.

Jeff

Just to let you know, Thunder Runs actually began in the first gulf war. It seems that this time out on a "Thunder Run", it turned into a full fledge battle.

Actually, Thunder Runs go back to Vietnam.

Jeff

Jeff is right about the term going back to Vietnam. A thunder run is essentially a recon by fire, and that is what the military really calls it. Thunder run is a nickname.

From what I read so far (not jsut the book Thunder Run, but also the Army's book "On Point") the first thunder run was essentially a test of the defenses with no intention of going anywhere but the airport. The division senior commanders liked what they saw and wanted to try a test into the city center for the second thunder run, which was much riskier. When the men found out about it they were very put off by the idea.

The 2nd thunder run was a bit more like a battle with artillery taking a more decisive role and the infantry dismounting at a number of locations (overpasses mostly) to hold ground. Once in the city infantry took up positions on rooftops as well as the palaces being occupied as a base of operations.

What is quite unique when you think about the Army's tactics is that the two attacks were armor heavy (especially the first one) in a city environment, which as pointed out earlier, is historically suicide for the armored force (not just the Russians). The Army pretty much knew their enemy was not up to the task of defending the city, tested it on the first thunder run, and was willing to confirm it with a risky attack the second time around. I don't think the 3rd ID would have made the same decisions on the thunder runs if the defenders were better organized. The Army and Marines knew their enemy fairly well. Yes we all know the enemy pulled some surprises, but not anything the US or British could easily react to. The coalition ALWAYS had the initiative.

Bob

Good, at least I was corrected, thank you very much. I thought they originated back in D.Storm.

Andy,

I'd never use photos without credit, that's why I will only post links (once I uncover them- after the kids don't need the computer for homework). The images I have gathered off the net simply are not mine to post.

That said, I have seen VERY few photos of the Thunder Runs in April 2003. A few, plus a few that may (I can't confirm) be from Highway 8 after the 2nd Thunder Run.

Andy if you have any shots taken during the actual Thunder Runs, or links to them I'd love to see them! I've been looking for a while, but maybe not in the right places!

And we'd be honored to have access to your pics! I think this community is pretty responsible!

And THANK YOU for your service!!

Jim

I've read Thunder Run myself, I think it's facsinating that I've been to all the locations that are mentioned in the book and didn't have any idea what happened there until I got back home last May. As a former member of 3rd Infantry Division,(Operation Desert Storm) the bravery and sheer determination of the soldiers involved fills me with pride.

Sorry for the LONG delay from saying I'd have some links in 2-3 days and now, but, well, better late than never!

There are more links with Thunder Run images, or from the general area and point in time.This link requires a fair amount of poking around to find all the images. Try going to the Smugmug home page and searching from there. Also take the time to fgo through the many images on this site- its'worth it!

http://Knighthawk.smugmug.com/gallery/260401/1

Jim