The extent and willingness of NATO in utilising nuclear munitions in such wide-ranging scenarios continues to fascinate; battlefield nukes abounded and if anything say, like a Soviet tank regiment was seen in an assembly area then stand-by.

You couldn't leave one 20 year old with all that responsibility.

The difference back then was the young guys didn't come on a team to tell everyone the latest and greatest from the Q Course as they do now. We kept our mouths shut and learned from some of the best SF NCO's who ever lived.

Ah, Cod War. At least it would have been a stand up fight.

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You couldn't leave one 20 year old with all that responsibility.

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Yeah because multiple 20-year old young men are always more responsible than just one. Witness all the YouTube videos that start with the immortal words "Hey, dude, watch this!"

Ah, Cold War. At least it would have been a stand up fight.

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Ah, Cold War. At least it would have been a stand up fight.

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Well, yeah, if you could call immediate total nuclear war "a stand-up fight".

Our mistake was not recognizing that the Soviet leadership was clinically paranoid and that they were mirroring their pathology on us. They believed their own propaganda that we were just waiting for the right time to attack and that we would launch a nuclear "bolt from the blue" to start things off. (It's what they would do if they were us.) Given their inevitable demise from such a scenario they adopted a policy of a massive but relatively limited nuclear strike upon threat of conflict. While we may have "ridden out" a single bomb or missile going off, once they started their D-Day plan of obliterating every seaport, airport, railway yard, powerplant, defense plant, airbase, army base, naval base, missile site, command center, weapons depot, and large city in western Europe we would have quickly (minutes, not hours) gone to counterforce and countervalue strikes on the USSR, followed by parallel strikes coming this way.

And as I said before, that would be that.

KL

Now it's too late to edit it.

Our mistake was not recognizing that the Soviet leadership was clinically paranoid and that they were mirroring their pathology on us. They believed their own propaganda that we were just waiting for the right time to attack and that we would launch a nuclear "bolt from the blue" to start things off. (It's what they would do if they were us.) Given their inevitable demise from such a scenario they adopted a policy of a massive but relatively limited nuclear strike upon threat of conflict. While we may have "ridden out" a single bomb or missile going off, once they started their D-Day plan of obliterating every seaport, airport, railway yard, powerplant, defense plant, airbase, army base, naval base, missile site, command center, weapons depot, and large city in western Europe we would have quickly (minutes, not hours) gone to counterforce and countervalue strikes on the USSR, followed by parallel strikes coming this way.

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Our mistake was not recognizing that the Soviet leadership was clinically paranoid and that they were mirroring their pathology on us. They believed their own propaganda that we were just waiting for the right time to attack and that we would launch a nuclear "bolt from the blue" to start things off. (It's what they would do if they were us.) Given their inevitable demise from such a scenario they adopted a policy of a massive but relatively limited nuclear strike upon threat of conflict. While we may have "ridden out" a single bomb or missile going off, once they started their D-Day plan of obliterating every seaport, airport, railway yard, powerplant, defense plant, airbase, army base, naval base, missile site, command center, weapons depot, and large city in western Europe we would have quickly (minutes, not hours) gone to counterforce and countervalue strikes on the USSR, followed by parallel strikes coming this way.

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It's interesting to read a book by Steve Zaloga on the Soviet's nuclear forces between 1949 and 2000. For the years prior to about 1972-74, the Soviet nuclear force was significantly behind the US and the west in terms of capability, throw weight, reliability, launch reaction time, etc. During the worst of the Cold War in the early 60s the soviets had only a small fraction of the US's nuclear capability. If it had gone "toe to toe with the Ruskies" in the mid 60s, and if the US had launched first, the Soviets really could not have put up more than a token reply. This also framed much of their rhetoric and their force design. They knew they couldn't survive a first strike and so designed their forces to strike not at the drop of a hat but at the first instant they thought the hat might be dropped. Which is a whole different threat level, especially in nuclear politics.

That we all got out of alive is, if not a miracle, at least a very fortunate and moderately unlikely event.

Paul

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Ah, Cold War. At least it would have been a stand up fight.

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Well, yeah, if you could call immediate total nuclear war "a stand-up fight".

Our mistake was not recognizing that the Soviet leadership was clinically paranoid and that they were mirroring their pathology on us. They believed their own propaganda that we were just waiting for the right time to attack and that we would launch a nuclear "bolt from the blue" to start things off. (It's what they would do if they were us.) Given their inevitable demise from such a scenario they adopted a policy of a massive but relatively limited nuclear strike upon threat of conflict. While we may have "ridden out" a single bomb or missile going off, once they started their D-Day plan of obliterating every seaport, airport, railway yard, powerplant, defense plant, airbase, army base, naval base, missile site, command center, weapons depot, and large city in western Europe we would have quickly (minutes, not hours) gone to counterforce and countervalue strikes on the USSR, followed by parallel strikes coming this way.

And as I said before, that would be that.

KL

Brian,
I've looked through several boxes of my photos so far (literally thousands) and only found two so far. Even then I was making composite photos. I'm sure one day I'll stumble across the rest. It would probably just be quicker if I drop by Ft. Sill and photograph the thing again. I remember going through a whole 36 exposure roll on this subject. If only we could have foreseen the advent of digital photography - I'd have at least three of four more junk motorcycles in my garage than I do now. Here's what I have so far from two I put together:


The good news I'm a few thousand closer to finding the rest.
More good news - on the topic of the SADM - I think I have found the only photos in existence of an SF ODA training with a SADM device. It's in front of me in my own Klepper kayak, so (D'oh!) no photos of it. There's just a few team members and the "target" bridge on south post at Ft. Devens.






Of course, there were two SADM qualified dudes per ODA. You couldn't leave one 20 year old with all that responsibility.
Too bad the selfie wasn't in vogue back then.

However, they were interesting times!

H.P.