Quoted Text
Yes it's a far stretch.
In summary, the German navy was destroyed in Norway. The Luftwaffe was seriously hurt and needed time to rebuild.
The RAF was never close to being defeated, having a constantly growing force during the battle, the Royal Navy who is a much bigger issue were never even tested.
Having demonstrated they would fail to defeat the RAF they tried to defeat moral and failed at that.
The only way they would have crossed the channel is as an occupation force. Not an invasion force.
That is not impossible, but is not what people are talking about.
The argument is in regards to Axis capability for invasion. The German Navy was certainly not destroyed in Norway. Capital ships still sailed forth well after 1940. The German submarine threat was the largest in the world at that time, and would continue to grow (almost throttling the N. Atlantic, despite the RN). The Luftwaffe was at the top of its game in 1940, and far outnumbered the beleaguered RAF in quantity of aircrew and aircraft:
1) The argument of not having enough shipping is dispelled by the presence of large numbers of barges, ferry's and shipping necessary for crossing a mere 25 mile distance-- so they had a plausible threat in their capability-- and later managed to get an entire army into N. Africa across a much greater distance despite the presence of the RN and RAF.
2) The argument that the RN would have stopped the invasion ignores the increasing presence of U-boats and E-boats in the channel approaches (and now with French home ports), and the RNs requirements for safeguarding vital Commonwealth trade routes, and the fact it was the Luftwaffe who controlled the airspace over the channel, not the RAF (in summer and fall of 1940), the RAF fighter arm wisely being prohibited from cross-channel pursuit or attack (except by night).
3) The RAF was hanging on a thread-- ACM Downing even said as much. It wasn't the immediate lack of aircraft, but the lack of trained aircrew-- a similar thing happened to the Germans in 1944-- aircraft aplenty, but no one trained to fly them. RAF Pilot losses simply couldn't be sustained while the Luftwaffe attacked the airfields during the day. Logistically speaking, even aircraft construction and supply were at risk-- England doesn't produce its own oil or rubber-- it has to come from someplace, with German subs in the North Atlantic, that was the RNs mission--keeping the sea lanes open. No doubt the RN would have been brought to bear in an invasion, but at what risk? It remains to be seen whether they would have been able to get from home port to invasion site effectively under continuous air and undersea attack. Everyone puts faith in the battleship-- but Billy Mitchell (and later the Bismark, Repulse, Prince of Wales, Arizona and Yamato) proved that wrong.
4) The British Army left most of their mechanized equipment (some of which was inadequate to begin with) in France (they didn't have the shipping or time to get it back). The RAF was withdrawn because it was viewed as the more valuable defensive arm. No doubt British Tommies would have defended those beaches and ports to the last man, the last bullet. But if the Panzers had gotten across, there would be little to stop them. The home Guard was training with pitchforks.
Bottom line-- it was a close run thing-- and only German miscalculation and political stupidity kept it from happening, not the logistics. The tactics might have been flawed, but given time, the Germans would likely have gotten ashore. Would they have been able to stay ashore? That is the real question.
VR, Russ
Campaigns Administrator
