If Honda’s have a bad impact record,I would switch to a Subaru. I’ve been driving Honda’s for over 40yrs.Got a new Passport. Love it !

Yes but not a tank killer.

Perhaps a better question would be "Why were the GERMANS using obsolete tanks all through the war?". Examples: PzII (obsolete in 1939) still in use for recce by "HJ" in Normandy; French Somuas issued to 21PD in Normandy; French Char B, fitted with flamethrowers still in service for training in PzAbt 224 at Arnhem; PzIV, despite upgrades, design dated back to the 1930's, still in frontline service in 1945, in fact the only design that did see service all through the war.
BTW, if the feeling is that the Sherman was bad, think on the Russian name for the Grant; much disliked, the tanks sent to Russia via Lend Lease were christened "a grave for seven brothers".

Alright. I'm posting this article here because most of you won't bother going to an outside link. This is an indictment, perhaps that's too harsh of word, of "Death Traps" I will post the link at the bottom. And some of you if not all will go "ugh too long did not read". But read it anyway.

From Tank and AFV News:

"When it comes to the history of armored warfare in the Second World War, the US M4 Sherman tank is always sure to draw controversy and a good bit of discussion. Invariably, when this topic is raised in an online forum, someone will bring up the book “Death Traps” by Belton Cooper. With a forward by popular historian Stephen Ambrose and the backing of a major publisher, Death Traps has become quite well known amongst WW2 history aficionados. Mr. Cooper has been featured in TV documentary specials as well, including the history channel series “Engineering Disasters“, which has further increased awareness of his book.

Death Traps is an unusual book. It is written in the style of a memoir, but it also presents itself as a history of the 3rd Armored Division, the unit in which Cooper served as an ordnance Lieutenant. The main theme of the book is that M4 Sherman was, as the title implies, a “death trap” to the men that operated them. However, the book has several flaws. As a memoir, it is meandering and repetitive, far too often wandering away from the authors personal experiences into the realm of speculation. As a history it is lacking, containing no end notes, foot notes or bibliography. And finally, as an indictment of the M4 Sherman tank, the book is filled with so many factual errors and outright falsehoods, it cannot be taken seriously on this count either.

The most interesting and valuable parts of the book are where Cooper sticks to his personal experiences as an ordnance officer. The insights he gives into the daily life of the 3rd Armored Division and its soldiers are intriguing, although they make up too little of the books three hundred pages. Of particular interest to armor and tank enthusiasts is his writings concerning the “Super Pershing” project, with which he was personally involved. The story concerning M4 crews who inadvertently stretched out the retaining clips for the main gun ammunition by stashing bottles of cognac inside them is amusing and no doubt of interest to people wanting to know more about the day to day life of Sherman crews. However, there are not enough of these sorts of stories in the book. Instead, the reader is subjected to Mr. Cooper veering off into stories he had heard second hand or into broader topics only loosely related to his experiences. For example, the reader is forced to endure Mr. Coopers opinion on everything from German V2 rockets and jet fighters to General George Patton’s (supposed) influence on US tank design.

Another aspect of the book that becomes rather frustrating is the authors frequent and persistent hyperbole. Everything is overstated. For example, when the author witnesses an aerial battle between US bombers and German fighters, it is described as “the most spectacular aerial battle of the war.” His admiration for the German opponent seems to know no limits, referring to the German General staff as “brilliant” (for creating the Siegfried line!?) He states that “Military historians have often agreed that until you’ve fought the German Army, you have never fought a real battle.” This statement is of on its face absurd (and potentially insulting to his brothers in arms in the Pacific campaign.) When the author relates how he was forced to take command of an armored column and assume a position outside of Mons, he feels it necessary to tell the reader “I have often reflected on the significance of our position at this road junction on the outcome of the battle of Mons.” Seeing as the column the author was commanding did not encounter the enemy, the significance of the action would appear to most reasonable readers to be fairly minimal.

As to the M4 Sherman tank, his penchant for hyperbole extends fully into the opposite direction. The M4 Sherman is not just inferior to German tanks, it is “tragically” and “vastly” inferior. According to the author, the decision to concentrate production on the M4 was “one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect on the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic.”(page 28) Later, he adds to this sentiment, stating that if US forces had been equipped with a better tank during the November 1944 offensive, “The battle of the Bulge may have never taken place, some 182,000 German and American casualties might have been averted, and the war could have ended five months earlier.” (page 155)

In regards to the main thesis of this book, that the M4 Sherman was a “death trap”, the author relies on a fairly narrow sets of figures and anecdotes, which he repeats multiple times throughout the book. Unfortunately, his writings display a surprising level of ignorance about the weapon systems of which he speaks. Names and designations are repeatedly misidentified, and basic information regarding the performance of various weapon systems are presented incorrectly. Granted, in most soldier memoirs, errors on technical matters are bound to crop up. This is expected and forgivable. However, Death Traps is not just a soldiers memoir. It is an intentional indictment by an ordnance officer concerning the primary piece of equipment he was charged with being responsible for. Therefore, one would expect more care to be taken to ensure that the facts presented regarding the subject of the book would in fact be correct.

Below are a list of technical errors found in the book. Some of these are relatively trivial, while others are far less forgivable and undermine the authors credibility on the topic.

Cooper lays the blame on the delay of getting the M26 Pershing into service in Western Europe on the influence and judgment of General George Patton. As a field commander, Patton has little influence on such decisions. Most books on this topic lay the blame at the feel of General Leslie McNair, commander of US Army Ground Forces, responsible for the organization, training and preparation of the U.S. Army for overseas service.
Cooper repeatedly misidentifies German cannons, referring to the PaK 40 anti-tank gun and the Kwk 40 tank gun as the Pak 41 and Kwk 41. This is a rather small error and forgivable. More egregious is his stating that the “Kwk41” was superior to the M1 76mm gun found on later models of the M4 Sherman. The two guns were actually almost indistinguishable from each other in terms of armor piercing performance when using the most common AP rounds available at the time.
Cooper describes the Pz4 as a 22ton tank with four inches of frontal armor, and a wider track than the Sherman. The late war Pz4 was actually 28 tons, had a little more than three inches of frontal armor (not slopped) and had a relatively narrow track , necessitating the use of grousers, much like the M4. (page 24)
Cooper repeatedly refers to the 75mm gun that equipped the M4 Sherman as the “M2.” The M2 75mm gun was a shorter version that was used in early versions of the M3 medium tank. This gun was never used in any production version of the Sherman, they all had the longer M3 75mm gun.
He confuses the engines mounted in various models of the M4. While he correctly states that the Continental R975 Radial engine powers the M4, he incorrectly identifies the engine in the M4A1 as the Ford GAA. This error is rather odd since he also refers to the M4A1 as “essentially the same tank as the M4 but with an improved high-velocity 76mm gun and a different turret.” (page 24) Actually, the M4A1 came with either the 75 or 76mm guns, the difference between an M4 and a M4A1 was that the M4 had a welded hull, the M4A1 had a cast hull. Both the M4 and the M4A1 had the R975 radial engine.
Cooper seems rather confused as to the details of the Ford GAA and GAF series of engines. He repeatedly states their HP rating as 550. This is incorrect, most sources list maximum gross HP at 500 and net HP at 450. Cooper refers to the Ford engine as a V8 in reference to it in the Sherman (page 79), but in the Pershing it somehow becomes an inline 8 (page 213). He also claims that “Ford Motor Company, under the direction of the ordnance department, had taken the British Rolls Royce Merlin engine and cut it down to eight cylinders.” This is completely untrue. The Ford design was similar to the Merlin, but it was not a copy. It was an original Ford design, created as a 12 cylinder airplane engine. Ford cut the engine down to 8 cylinders to adapt it for service in tanks.
Cooper states that “the power ratio of the M26 was approximately 12 horsepower per ton compared to 10 horsepower per ton on the M4” and that the M26 was “faster and more agile over rough terrain.” (page 26) He has the power to weight figures all wrong. According to Hunnicutts books “Sherman” and “Pershing”, the M4 and the M4A1 had a gross power to weight ratio of 12 HP per ton. The Pershing had a gross power to weight ratio of 10.8 HP per ton. When we throw the M4A3 into the mix, the numbers look even worse for Pershing, as the A3 had a gross power to weight ratio of 13.5 HP per ton. The M26 was always regarded as an underpowered vehicle until it was upgraded to the M-46.
Cooper exaggerates the ground pressure advantage that the Pershing had over the Sherman models with the vertical volute spring suspension. He states that “Although it (Pershing) was heavier than the Sherman, its longer and wider track gave it a ground bearing pressure of three to four pounds per square inch compared to seven pounds per square in for the Sherman.” (page 211. According to Hunnicutt, the Ground pressure of an M4 is 13.7 psi. Ground pressure for an M26 is 12.5 psi. Also, this does not take into account that at the same time that the Pershing was being introduced, the HVSS suspension was introduced on the Sherman, giving it a wider track with an even better ground pressure rating of only 11psi
Cooper seems very confused on the topic of suspensions. For example, he states: “The (Pershing) track was supported by large, overlapping bogey wheels suspended on torsion bar spring systems. This was the old Christy (sic) system, which had been developed by the Americans some twenty years previously and had been adopted by the Germans and the Russians. The Christy (sic) system allowed amuch wider track, and also the torsion bar syspension had a greater amplitude than the old coil spring system on the M4 Sherman. This system permitted a much easier ride over rough terrain at higher speeds, and the increased amplitude gave the tank better traction going over rough ground or ascending rugged slopes. All American tanks that came after the M-26 Pershing used the Christy (sic) system.” (page 211) This paragraph is riddled with errors. First, “Christy” is not the correct spelling, the proper spelling is “Christie” as in Walter J. Christie, the man you invented this form of suspension. It should also be noted that the Christie suspension did not use torsion bars as Cooper states but rather coil springs. Interestingly, Cooper does mention coil springs, but instead of doing so in reference to the Christie system, he does so in reference to the M4. Of course, the M4 suspension used volute springs, not coil springs, so that is incorrect as well. The Germans never used the Christie suspension, instead relying primarily on either leaf springs or torsion bars. The only countries that actually used the Christie suspension were the Russians, as Cooper correctly states, and the British, who Cooper neglects to mention. After WW2 both Russia and the UK abandoned the use of Christie style suspensions do to the fact that they were outdated. The US army has never used the Christie suspension system in any of their WW2 or post war tank designs.
Cooper states that the “Sherman had to get within six hundred yards of the Panther and hope to catch it on the flank” in order to knock it out. The side armor on a Panther was actually comparatively thin, being 45mm on the turret side and 40mm on the hull side. This meant that the Panther could be penetrated through the side at normal battlefield ranges by both the 75 and 76 mm guns of the M4 Sherman.

The above list is some, but not all, of the demonstrably incorrect facts presented in the book. Next I want to look at claims made in the book that just seem odd. I cannot prove these to be incorrect, but they don’t pass the smell test.

Cooper claims that on July 11 the German Panzer Lehr division attacked US forces near St. Lo using Jagdpanthers. It is extremely unlikely that Jagdpanthers were used in this attack. Most likely Cooper has confused Jagdpanther with the more general term Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer). Cooper presents this attack as “one of the most critical in the battle of Normandy. The Germans launched a massive counterattack along the Saint-Lo-Saint Jean de Daye highway in an attempt to capture Carentan and Isigny and split the First Army in two.” This description is a gross exaggeration on the part of Cooper. The July 11 counter attack is generally considered a relatively minor event in the overall Normandy campaign. The Panzer Lehr division lost 20 tanks in this attack while inflicting only light casualties on US forces.

Cooper seems to have a fixation with M12 self propelled guns destroying German tanks. In the book, he only gives a few examples of actual tank on tank duels. Oddly enough, two of these involve the M12.

“At one point, a German tank came through an opening in a hedgerow and encountered an M12 with its 155mm GPF zeroed in on the gap. The 155 let go and struck the tank at the base of the turret, completely decapitating it. The turret and gun were blown off, and the tank stopped in its tracks.” (Page 38-39)
Later in the book when discussing the battle of the Bulge, he has this story:
” In one incident, and M12 gun carriage with its 155mm GPF rifle loaded came around a bend in the road and suddenly found itself face to face with a King Tiger. Fortunately, the 155 was pointed directly at the base of the King Tiger’s turret. The gun commander gave the order to fire. The 155 struck the King Tiger at the base of the gun mantlet where the turret joins the deck. The explosion ruptured the thin top deck armor and blew the turret off the tank, instantly killing the entire crew. Had the shell struck a few inches lower on the front glacis plate, it would have exploded harmlessly, and the King Tiger would have been able to drill the M12 from end to end with its high-velocity 88. Such are the fortunes of war.” (Page 171)

Without a way to confirm or disprove these claims, I will simply let the reader make their own judgment on the plausibility of these stories.

Cooper concludes his book by stating that “The German tanks had a qualitative superiority of as much as five to one of our M4 Sherman.” (page 308) The “five to one” myth has been repeated in many books and documentaries over the years. However, it is a myth that does not stand up to scrutiny. To quote noted tank expert Steven Zaloga from his book “Osprey Duel 13 Panther Vs Sherman”

“The popular myths that Panthers enjoyed a 5-to-1 kill ratio against Shermans or that it took five Shermans to knock out a Panther have no basis at all in the historical records. ”

For the sake of my own sanity, I am going to leave my review of “Death Traps” here for the moment. Consider this “Part 1.” At some point I’ll pick this up again with a more detailed explanation of why the armor and firepower advantages of German Armor which Cooper mentions continuously in his book did not actually translate into German armored units being more combat effective than US armored units.

Also, just to make this perfectly clear, I am not criticizing Mr. Cooper’s service to his country or his character. I am criticizing his book, not him."

https://tankandafvnews.com/2015/01/29/debunking-deathtraps-part-1/

Honestly, seriously, you would be better off just walking away. Yes, someone might continue to hold wrong ideas. So what?

KL

In addition to all the factual info presented by several folks on this subject, we shouldn't forget what Oddball told Kelly,,, "A Sherman can give you a very nice 'edge'."

If you are getting your information from Cooper’s book then there really isn’t too much to discuss.

Like when he claims that the tank was named “sherman” due to a northern state conspiracy. I mean it’s just sad and even worse that the history channel and others jumped all over it and ran with that nonsense. I’ve even heard rumors that the man didn’t even write the book himself but rather a family member or someone looking to cash in did in his stead quoting him from interviews. The recollections of a 85-90 year old man that never fought in tanks.

Of course cooper had a negative view of shermans, they’d been told like most people in America that tanks were impervious and then here he is scrapping dead flesh out of tanks on a daily basis to get them repaired and sent back into the field. He worked in a triage for tanks so his POV was a tad obscured by seeing only wrecked tanks constantly as part of his job. If we’d of had the pershing and he’d worked on those by the hundreds he might’ve written the same about those too. But in his book the Pershing was like a god send that for some reason the government refused to furnish to GIs. The whole thing just reeks of tin foil hat type paranoia, it’s a complete joke, it’s just not a credible in any way and definitely not something you want to quote or reference in any discussion about sherman tanks if you want to be taken seriously.

Yep, I’ve read it from cover to cover twice (if only to discuss it on forums like this) and it’s far and away one of the worst books I’ve ever read about WW2. It’s riddled with so much inaccurate information that it’s really laughable and the gentleman constantly talks about things he had no way of knowing about, it’s just one big hot mess.

'Well, any tank back then could be defeated from the side and rear and top. As I said before head to head. I have to correct myself. I knew TWO former WW 2 Sherman crewmen. BOTH said they could’nt keep a full crew because German anti- tank and tank gun’s would kill them. They did’nt like Sherman’s because of this.Not reliability, number of them built,etc. My cousin was an M-46 driver in Korea. If you don’t believe Cooper’s book,whatever. I knew 2 Sherman tanker’s who I got MY info from. I believe THEM. And they didn't lie'

Funny, Otto Carious said the same thing about anti-tank guns. He was far more concerned about them than tanks because they would be camouflaged and you would not see them until they fired.

I think Patric Bowers and Marc have had the best comments. Much of the early conversation has been from modelers and gamers. (it is after all a model website!) Maybe this discussion is better suited for a tank museum forum. It is like blowing a bugle outside the Old Soldiers Home. Everybody gets excited. But that is good!....As time goes on we have fewer and fewer American tankers alive. The same goes for the German side as well as the Russian side. I need to go back to my books and see what they said about the "other side".Yes, I am "old" 68. I have been modeling for most of my life, I am a retired military museum curator (not tanks)built many exhibits/exhibit labels/lectures in my field. And have published. My home library is around 3,000 volumes on history/military history. We need to watch as many interviews of tanker vets as we can. But even that won't be enough. War production as mr. Bowers has stated is od prime importance.

No disrespect, I'm just wondering, when people talk about the vehicle they would rather be in, Pz V Panther in this case, had they operate said tank? There are plenty of things that look better it actually is.

If car was a relevant analog, then it is like offering an Lamborghini vs Honda Civic, no one would say no to Lamborghini, but it doesn't mean that they would be able to pay to maintain or repair it afterward.

The stationary Anti-Tank build in the super fortress are much more effective against tank than a tank itself. So if performance in 1 vs 1 was such a deciding factor for that, why even get a tank in the 1st place?

Did you go to ASA at Devens?

Yeah, I was a Hawg. The Few, The Proud, The Demented. But I loved it. I ran tactical jammers, direction finding equipment, and been to a lot of those big intel sites world wide. Worked on Teufelsburg, Devil's Mountain, in Berlin.

What a hugh amount of lltank expertise” is shown here......
And it all started with a black board analyses, based on load of assumptions.
Reminds me of the days where we, as young armour lieutenants, told ourselves that with our modern tanks we would live not longer thant 85 seconds in actuall combat.
If the creator would have been only slightly right, how on earth come the allied won the war anyhow?

When I was with 10th Group at Devens, the ASA instructors used to tell the female trainees that what they were learning was so secret, the SF guys would kill them if the Russians ever attacked. So stay away from the SF guys. It never seemed to work. I wonder if we knew some of the same soldiers.
I'm sure you know the nickname for the Snack Bar in the middle of the Post.

The Brigade (Censored) Bar. Pitchers of beer were $2.50. What a lot of folks didn't know was that those big intel sites were to be taken out by our own forces should the balloon go up. Daily overflights by our bombers on practice run over the sites emphasized this. But in Berlin we didn't have friendly air so they parked a couple of howitzers and trained them on us. I was on the destruct team for our platoon and I would be one of the last out of T-burg as we set it to burn and blow up. Pretty cool I thought until I got to Ft. Lewis. A few months after I got to my new unit we got a couple guys in our ground surveillance platoon. We were talking to them and one said he reclassed from Pershing II crew since they pulled them out of Europe. He was in the Zone while I was in Berlin. He said "You worked on Teufelsburg didn't ya?" I said yeah and he said "you knew you weren't to fall into russian hands right?" I said yeah, told him about the destruct procedures and the artillery. He looked at me and grinned said to me "you also had a tac nuke pointed at you. Mine."

Robert and Patrick-- Really great Cold War tidbits you guys are talking about. The bit about having a tac nuke pointed at one of our own installations is a bit scary though.

During the Cuban missile crisis JKF knew that if he attacked Cuba, Berlin was gone. 5000 plus US, French and British personnel. What a lot of people didn't know is that Berlin was still considered a WWII occupied city where we were allied with the Soviets. The US never formally recognized E. Germany but the Soviets were one of the four nations occupying Berlin. We'd see Soviet officers in our PX and commissary occasionally and if you were in uniform you saluted them and gave them the greeting of the day. Just like we did to Brit and French officers.

Beside the point that the base statement (that the allied tanks were obsolete) isn't true, there is one very, very simple thing, why the allied aircrafts were quickly on par or superior to the Axis ones, while the armored technique were one step behind the top-end german tanks.

Time. The time which needed to acquire and gather all the necessary knowledge of tank design. The Germans started to develop their tank forces as early as 1933. The development of the Pz.III started in 1935, the Pz.IV in 1936. They collected the knowledge gradually from smaller, simplier tanks, learned from the unavoidable mistakes.
The USA started to develop the M4 (and the M3 Lee) as a reaction to the Blitz and the success of the Panzerdivisions in France. it was in 1940! There were no industrial background of mass production of tanks, there were no engine, designed for tanks or heavy armor. At first they delegated the production to locomotive factories simply because those were capable of building heavy vehicles. Yet in two years (not three or four) the M4 was operable and ready to battle. The Germans needed ten years to arrive from the Pz.I to the Panther, half of it in peacetime. The USA get from the M2 to the M26 Pershing in four years, with much less direct first hand battlefield data.

The the Allied airplanes were able to compete with the Germans much faster because airplane industry boomed in the interwar years. The military planes of the early war years may have been obsolate (though no Luftwaffe pilot thought it when was chased by a Spitfire...), but the knowledge of how to design a better aircraft (in all details, from engine to the airframe) was there from the very first moment.

Lazlo!
Greetings!!

You also have to take into account that the USAAF and Allies main priority was hampering German Fighter Production. The Allies dominated the air over Europe by the time of D-Day, so the added dimension of Tank vs Aircraft wasn't as big an issue as on the Eastern Front.

Side Bar-Albert Speer said the US could have ended the war sooner if they would have hit the same targets repetitively.
He said they would bomb, the Germans would be up and running again in 2 weeks, but the allies wouldn't hassle them, thinking they were destroyed.

From a Tank design standpoint, I would think that German Design advancements didn't happen through lack of trying, but rather through lack of their manufacturing and delivery. With the constant aerial pressure, the Germans were able to fix-restore or move their manufacturing facilities. My point being that it would be very difficult to maintain any semblance of combat strength on the front, while diverting resources to tank development/manufacturing.

They didn't.

One of the other things hampering Germany was Hitler himself. He kept wanting more new weapons to the point that he interfered with the industry needed to keep his troops fighting. If Hitler had left his fingers out of everything and let his generals fight the war it might have been different. I remember reading a while back that the allies could have killed Hitler from the air many times during the latter part of the war but didn't because someone competent might have taken over. How true that was we'll never know but Hitler was his own worst enemy.

Hardly related to the topic, but the Hallstein doctrine was abandoned in the early '70s. By 1974 the US had full diplomatic relations with East Germany.

Right. And had the war gone on longer, the US were developing some awesome tanks.Just took us awhile to get our butts in gear.

To sum it up, I’ve talked to US Sherman tankers to base my info on.Not the war dept. or generals back in the states. I’m talking about the men who fought in the tanks. And they wanted a bigger gun and more armor. That’s what THEY told me.

Long live armor models!! Really like how my skills have improved over the years. Been building since 1962.Took a few yrs. (a lot!) to get fairly good at it. Love you fellow modelers! Build them kit’s!!

I bet most German and Soviet tankers wanted better armour and bigger guns too. Most German tankers were not driving Panthers or Tigers and most Soviet tankers were not in their heavies either.